郭炎 袁奇峰 邱加盛

Guo Yan, Yuan Qifeng, Qiu Jiasheng

关键词：三旧改造；土地产权制度；非农化村庄；把持问题；可持续发展

Keywords：Three-old Redevelopment; Institution of Land Rights; Non-agricultural Villages; Hold-up Problem; Sustainable Development

摘要：

以集体建设用地为核心的存量改造在广东推行已逾七年。检讨相关政策实施的文献，发现利益各方围绕土地增值收益的博弈是推动改造和塑造结果的关键。同时, 规划调控弱、开发强度过高和公益设施配套不足极为普遍。然而，从微观层面对改造失控背后制度性逻辑的研究匮乏。此外，已有研究多视开发商逐利、政府寻租以及两者的合谋为改造失控的主因，而对土地持有者如农村集体的角色鲜有涉及。本文结合制度变迁的理论和村庄改造案例的深度实证探讨制度转型、利益各方权利关系演化和博弈的结果。研究发现旧改政策强化了村集体的地权，但对土地增值收益的再分配未充分界定。在不确定的制度环境下，积极推动改造的政府先期投入以保障集体收益，而村集体则依托现实的土地占有占据博弈的主动，不断“把持”政府，争夺土地收益，最终使政府在维持社会公益上逐步妥协，危及空间品质和社会公平，与包容性发展渐行渐远。旧改应力求政府统筹，完善利益分配和规划制度。

Abstract：

??It has been seven years since the initiation of redevelopment of the collectively-owned built-up land in Guangdong Province. Existing literature has found that competition for land rent appreciation among stakeholders is determinant for the smooth progress and outcomes of redevelopment. Weakness of planning control, excessively high land redevelopment intensity, and insufficient supply of commonweal facilities are prominent phenomena in reality. However, there is not much literature explaining the phenomena from the institution perspective and micro level. Besides, existing literature often highlights government’s rent seeking or coalition between governments and developers as the main causes. Roles of landholders in shaping the redevelopment outcomes are rarely explored. This paper examines the impacts of institutional transition, and changes in the power relationships and competition among stakeholders on redevelopment, combining the theories of new institutional economics and in-depth empirical investigation in a non-agricultural village. It has been found that redevelopment policy strengthens land rights of rural collectives, but profit-sharing among interests has not been clearly specified. In such an uncertain institutional circumstance, governments still invest in advance to keep villages’ existing collective incomes unchanged in the redevelopment process, thus the later can bargain with a good position and thus hold-up the former to maximize its own profits. In order to promote redevelopment, the government has to compromise in ensuring public profits, which reflects in its surrendering of much benefit to the villages, increase in Floor Area Ratio and insufficient supply in public facilities and open spaces. In order to advance inclusive development, coordination of government, and perfection in the institutions of profit-sharing and planning execution should be ensured.??

??郭炎，武汉大学城市设计学院讲师。tiverguo@whu.edu.cn

袁奇峰，中山大学地理科学与规划学院教授。qfy510060@163.com

邱加盛，广州中大城乡规划设计研究院有限公司。Mike.qiu@163.com

??

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