杨洁莹 张京祥

Yang Jieying, Zhang Jingxiang

关键词：资本下乡；法团主义；利益格局；乡村治理；婺源

Keywords：Capital-driven; Corporatism; Pattern; Rural Governance; Wuyuan

摘要：

如何善用资本是乡村振兴难以回避的话题，村民能否在资本下乡后持续获益是乡村振兴目标实现的关键，而村民获益的持续性与利益主体间的连接格局密切相关。基于法团主义视角，本文以江西省婺源县H 村为例，从组织架构、制度架构、利益架构三个角度进行分析，并研究它们之间的交互关联。结果显示，政府作为“公正人”的角色定位，有利于缓解村民和企业的冲突，最大化社会效益；村委会、合作社等中介主体的嵌入，能构建交流平台，维护村民利益；企业担负社会职责，能更紧密地联系村民群众；企业村民互动共赢的利益分配格局，有利于可持续收入。因此应加强政府管控指引，制定利民政策方针；建立中介组织嵌入式治理格局，协助构建以政府为主导的双向反馈模式；提高村民的认知意识，解决“非对称风险”；通过制度约束企业担负社会责任，以社会效益最大化为目标。研究可为资本下乡建构公平可持续的利益格局提供建议。

Abstract：

Attracting private capital has been employed as a popular method for rural revitalization in China. Nevertheless, as literature suggests, this method has raised many challenges to the villages, including unfair allocation of social resources, destroyed social fabric, and mounting interest conflicts among rural local governments, villagers, and private enterprises. As a response, the intermediary villager organizations have widely been used by the Chinese government during the implementation of rural revival programs, in order to facilitate the interests of different groups and to cope with the social conflicts. Applying the corporatism theory when analyzing the H Village, Wuyuan, Jiangxi, as a case, this paper argues that deliberately kept “neutral” role of local governments has functioned to alleviate the conflicts between villagers and enterprises, and to overcome the challenges that are largely caused by the dominance of private capitals. Also, enterprises with social responsibilities, which was given by government, can bind villagers more closely. Embedding the intermediary organizations such as village committees and cooperatives can provide a discussing channel to safeguard the interests of villagers. Reasonable distribution of interests between enterprises and villagers brings to a sustainable income. Therefore, it is necessary to strengthen government control and to formulate policies that benefits the people; to establish a government-led feedback model through intermediary organizations; to improve the villagers’ awareness on the revitalization for eliminating “asymmetric risks”; as well as to ask for social responsibilities taken by enterprises through regulations. The study provides suggestions to Chinese rural areas on the construction of a sustainable capital investment structure.

杨洁莹，南京大学建筑与城市规划学院，博士研究生

张京祥，博士，南京大学建筑与城市规划学院，教授。3593786@163.com

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